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Introduction
In the first years of civilian nuclear power development the general public knew little about the economic, technical and ecological aspects o f this new technology and what they did know was based on the public relations efforts o f the industry. From today's perspective, the arguments offered to citizens o f the 1950s and 1960s, such as the promise that atomic energy would become too cheap to meter, appear somewhat bizarre. Even the esthetic qualities of nuclear power stations seemed to be evident. In 1958, the citizens of Marcoule, the site o f the first two nuclear reactors in France, were invited to appreciate the "un-Elsewhere, a year earlier, Jean Pignero had become concerned with the effects of radioactivity, but it was not until 1962 that he founded the first anti-nuclear association in France (Pignero, 1981 ) . N either group, though for very differ ent reasons I will explore, could overcome its marginal and somewhat peculiar status.
It was not until the late 1960s that significant protest activities were reported in France. But for the next decade the harmonious image o f the benefits of nuclear energy production ( "Atoms for peace" ) was fundamentally challenged and opposition included large numbers o f people. In July 1971, some 15,000 rallied against the nuclear plant in Bugey. Pierre Fournier, one o f the most influential activists at the time, stated: " Bugey 01 : the take-off of an ecological movement in Europe, the first non-violent demonstration o f such a size on this side of the Atlantic, the birth of a new world..." (Fournier, 1975, p. 52) . The protests intensified quickly. The movement grew rapidly and reached its peak in 1977 when about 60,000 people, including many West Germans, demon strated against the fast breeder in Creys-Malville. The nuclear industry and associated governmental authorities were subject to harsh criticism, and thus the technology suffered a crisis o f legitimation. As the conflict escalated, how ever, Del Vasto's hopes for a non-violent upheaval were dashed. At Creys-Mal ville, a confrontation between the protesters and armed police left a young demonstrator, killed by a gas grenade, and many others wounded. For many, the movement had taken on broader political dimensions as well: "At the peak of its mobilization capacity, the movement entered into a battle against the state, and the movement broke down" (Touraine et al., 1980, p. 145 ) .
After this relatively short phase of mass mobilization and heated confronta tion the protests declined. By the 1980s the movement was scattered and weak while the French government continued to implement the most ambitious nu clear power program in the world.
Is the story o f nuclear power struggles in France unique? I will attem pt to answer this question in respect to the strategies, action repertoires and courses of anti-nuclear movements in the USA, France and West Germany; I will also consider the conceptual and methodological issues raised by the question, which are o f interest for research in social movements more generally. There are three parts to this paper. In the first, I examine the claims of H erbert Kitschelt's approach to account for cross-national variations in the strategies and out comes of anti-nuclear movements. In the second part, I will offer an overview o f empirical data from the three countries, that will form the basis for the de velopment o f a more complex explanatory concept for movement strategies and action repertoires offered in the third, and concluding, part.
Coinparing anti-nuclear power struggles: Kitschelt's structural approach There exists an impressive body o f literature on struggles over nuclear power. M ost of this work, however, is lim ited to a local or a national case. Few studies cover more than one country (Surrey and Huggett, 1976; Falk, 1982; Hatch, 1986; Fach and Simonis, 1987; Von Oppeln, 1989; Riidig, forthcoming) . And only a few o f these attem pt an am bitious systematic cross-national analysis (e.g. Nelkin and Poliak, 1981; Riidig, 1986) . I believe the most helpful and ingenious o f these are the studies o f nuclear power conflict by Herbert Kitschelt (Kitschelt, 1983 (Kitschelt, , 1986 . He attem pts "to use some of the rich detail of the existing case studies to construct a systematic comparison of the anti-nu clear power movements in France, Sweden, the U nited States and West Ger m any" (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 57) . He develops the concept of a " political oppor tunity structure" and it is from this conception that my argument begins. In this section, I will outline Kitschelt's discussion o f four anti-nuclear move m ents and his explanatory approach.
Kitschelt distinguishes between assimilative and confrontational strategies:
Assimilative strategies have included lobbying, petitioning government bodies, influencing public policy through referendum campaigns and partisan involvement in electoral contests. Additionally, movements have tried to affect policy implementation by participating in licens ing procedures and litigation. Confrontional strategies have included public demonstrations and acts o f civil disobedience, exemplified by occupations of nuclear plant sites and access roads. (1986, p. 67) W ith respect to the four movements under investigation, his classification o f their strategic choices is shown in Table 1 . He identifies three dimensions in which the outcome of oppositional movements may be measured: procedural impacts (such as access to formal political decision making), substantive pol icy impacts (such as the suspension o f nuclear power plant licensing and conIndustrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 Source. Kitschelt, 1986, p. 69. struction, the closing down o f operating plants, a reorientation o f energy poli cies towards energy conservation, and research on renewable energy resources) and structural impacts on the political regime itself. Kitschelt's findings on dif ferential outcomes are too complex to be presented here. O f particular rele vance to the present argument is his finding that, Political opportunity structures are divided into two sets of variables. The first he terms "political input structures," whose crucial dimension is the open ness of the political regime to new demands. Openness or closeness is deter mined by at least four concrete factors, including the number o f political par ties, the independence of the legislature in the development and control of policies, patterns o f mediation between interest groups and the excecutive branch, and aggregation mechanisms for new demands. The second he terms " political output structures," by which he means the capacity of political sys-
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This framework allows him to show how the strong and weak political output structures of, respectively, Sweden and the USA may relate to their similarly open political input structures and how the strong and weak output structures of, respectively, France and West Germany may relate to their similarly closed political output structures. To these structural assessments he correlates move ment strategies and impacts. Leaving aside the Swedish case he draws the fol lowing conclusions:
-In France, closed political input structures together with strong implementing capacities account for the dominance o f confrontational strategies, the relatively low impact o f the anti nuclear movement on the procedural and substantive level, and the movepient's strong struc tural pressures. -In the USA, highly open input structures and weak implementation capacities account for the prevailing assimilative movement strategies, significant procedural impacts, a tendency towards policy stalemate, medium-low innovation, and the movement's weak structural pressures.
-In West Germany, relatively closed input structures and weak implementation capacities account for the parallel use o f confrontational and assimilative movement strategies, and lim ited procedural impacts, few substantive impacts, a tendency towards policy stalemate, very low innovation, and the movement's strong structural pressures.
The author wisely expresses certain reservations about his classifications and interpretations, and acknowledges that differences in the openness and capac ity o f political regimes are continuous rather than discrete variables, that there may well be other factors determining political output and input structures and, finally, that domestic political opportunity structures cannot explain mobili zation strategies and impacts o f social movements in their entirety, but only to " a significant degree" (1986, p. 84) .
As I, too, am convinced of the im portant impact of political regime struc tures on social movements, it is not my intention to question this useful ap proach in principle. In my view, the level o f analysis in this approach is too abstract, the choice o f categories is too crude, the variables that have been se lected are too limited, and the empirical data are in some ways oversimplified. It seems to me that the author was too much tem pted by the logical clarity and elegance of his approach. My main argument is not that reality is more com plex than any analytical reconstruction. But, rather, I want to emphasize di mensions and factors that must be systematically included in this kind of com parative analysis. Otherwise, I believe such a structural approach will not have the explanatory power it claims. In the next section I will develop this emphasis by taking a closer look at the anti-nuclear movements in the USA, France and West Germany.
Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 Struggles over nuclear power: a description and comparison of three cases In this section I will draw a picture o f anti-nuclear struggles in three coun tries and focus in detail on the second half of the 1970s, the years o f greatest opposition to nuclear power production. I will highlight events and activities of these years with special attention to movement strategies and action reper toires, particularly as these features tend to disappear below the high level of data aggregation on which cross-national analysis is usually based. First, I will present a short history of the three cases, and, secondly, I will develop a more detailed comparison.
USA: m any campaigns, few skirmishes, no battles
Opposition to the civil use of nuclear energy was limited in the USA o f the late 1950s and 1960s. Although activities such as those during the Cayuga Lake controversy of the late 1960s preceded European protest movements, these lo cal activities had no national im pact and focused exclusively on legal forms of protest (Nelkin, 1971; Mitchell, 1981) . The anti-nuclear struggles "became a large-scale social movement with a distinct identity only after the devastating consequences of the 1973-1974 energy crisis" (Price, 1982, p. 9 ) . Conflicts within Congress, and between Congress and the White House, over energy pol icy contributed to the rise o f the nuclear debate in the wider public. For the opposition, an im portant point of contention was the dual function o f the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as both the prom oter and regulator o f nu clear power production. Well-known organizations, such as Friends of the Earth, Ralph Nader's Critical Mass, and the U nion of Concerned Scientists, devel oped a single-issue coalition politics to reorganize or abolish the AEC, to tighten safety standards and to extend the procedural opportunities for legal interven tion. After intensive internal struggles, the Sierra Club, the oldest and largest environmental assocation, also officially took an anti-nuclear position. Con fronted with the growing anti-nuclear critique, the adm inistration m ade some procedural concessions, but on the whole pursued the nuclear power program as planned. The struggle still focused on the exchange o f arguments. The gov ernment initiated an impressive safety report which came immediately under fire from the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists. Soon, the anti-nuclear opposition realized that the battle could not be won in the mere exchange of arguments.
In 1974, the first "national" anti-nuclear conference ( "Critical M ass" ) was held in Washington, DC. From that tim e on, the anti-nuclear m ovem ent in vested considerable energy in building up a close network and in integrating as many people as possible. Several contingent incidents fueled the anti-nuclear critique and sustained the m ovem ent's credibility. The most notable o f these included the mysterious death o f Karen Silkwood, the revelations that the Dia blo Canyon nuclear plant under construction rested on a geologic fault, the publication o f a skeptical report on reactor safety by the American Physical Society, and the dangerous fire at the Brown's Ferry nuclear plant. By the mid70s, the range o f publicly debated problems related to nuclear energy produc tion broadened to include the questions o f non-proliferation, the transport and storage of radioactive wastes, the side effects of uranium mining, the conse quences of a "plutonium economy," and the danger o f terrorist sabotage. Fun damental doubts on nuclear power production have become widespread in both the scientific community and broader sectors of the population (Price, 1982, p. 15) . With this, the movement had definitely shifted " from elite quarrel to mass movement" (Mitchell, 1981) .
M ore and more, local and regional groups intensified legal intervention. In particular, they tried to influence state legislature, block or impede licensing for new reactors, attain m oratoriums by referendum, gain access to evacuation plans, and so on. At this point, the activities of the anti-nuclear movement became highly visible. In 1975, one year after Silkwood's death, a large rally in New York City was organized. In the same year, a second Critical Mass confer ence took place at Washington, DC. The Silkwood case was investigated twice, although without any definite results.
Besides attem pts in various states to prepare legal interventions, the refer endum organized by the California Nuclear Safeguards Initiative, though ulti mately defeated, had considerable mass m edia coverage (Office o f Technology Assessment, 1984, p. 212) . In the struggle for a referendum in California (Proposition No. 15) and in other cases, pro-nuclear forces mobilized as well. Demonstrators were confronted with plant workers defending their jobs. Such powerful organizations as the Atomic Industrial Forum, the American Nuclear Society, individual corporations, and even right-wing associations like the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society supported pro-nuclear campaigns. On the one hand, the anti-nuclear movement was too strong to be neutralized by these forces. On the other, the tim e o f rapid gains of terrain seemed to be over. "Having been frustrated by the tactics o f legal intervention and voter refer enda, however, anti-nuclear groups turned to direct action" (Price, 1982, p. 17) . Inspired by the German example o f Wyhl, in 1976 the Clamshell Alliance occupied the construction site at Seabrook, New Hampshire. O ther alliances formed all over the country. During this period, direct action was considered an effective instrum ent and the actions at Seabrook were im itated elsewhere, particularly on the West Coast ( Katz and List, 1981; Cohen, 1982) . Hundreds were arrested and civil disobedience became widespread within the anti-nu clear movement. More than a simple tactic, this form o f action was seen as a Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 way to generate solidarity in a broader struggle against large-scale technology and corresponding structures of political power.
In 1977, demonstrations increased in frequency and number o f participants: 20,000 demonstrated at Seabrook. Nuclear power production faced a full-blown oppositional movement with an elaborated ideology, sophisticated arguments, a decentralized but effective organizational structure, and a clever use o f strat egies and forms o f action. These factors contributed to a gradual crisis o f nu clear energy production. With the shutdown of reprocessing plants and the dis engagement in fast breeder reactors prom oted by President Jim m y Carter, the long-term future o f nuclear energy seemed to be less attractive than several years previously. The costs of nuclear energy production increased dram atic ally due to higher security standards, construction delays and rising costs for raw uranium. Between 1977 and 1980 few additional commercial reactors went into operation and no more new reactors were ordered; later, a number o f plants under construction were abandoned. The nuclear industry in the USA experi enced a decline.
The Three Mile Island accident in March 1979 brought the deathblow for the extension o f nuclear power. This incident gave the anti-nuclear movement in the USA an enormous push for mobilization (Walsh, 1981) . After the acci dent, the largest anti-nuclear rally was held in Washington, DC, with an esti mated 65,000 participants. "The size o f the demonstrations and the num ber of persons arrested grew larger and larger. In October, at Battery Park, New York City, over 300,000 people turned out for a demonstration..." (Price, 1982, p. 
0 ).
In the 1980s, the nuclear industry could not recover from its setbacks. More extensive inform ation about the Three Mile Island accident, rising costs for nuclear power and, in particular, the Chernobyl disaster, contributed to the strengthening o f an anti-nuclear critique in public opinion. During the 1980s, confronted with the crisis of the nuclear industry, there was less need for the movement to be active, although it assumed the role of watchdog in m atters of nuclear power. Clearly, though not only because of its own abilities, the anti nuclear movement in the USA has won the battle.
France: the lost battle
Despite the fact in the early 1970s the French nuclear power program was still underdeveloped, the French anti-nuclear movement was the first to flour ish in Europe. By the end of 1970, the first regional anti-nuclear committee was created to oppose the nuclear reactor project in Fessenheim. In April 1971 a protest march there numbered about 1,500 people and included activists from the USA and members of the A m is de la terre ( the Earth, founded in 1971). Other activities that year included a large dem onstration of 15,000 at Fessenheim, an anti-nuclear camp and a sit-in near the site o f Bugey, and a final protest march from there to Lyon. A December 28, 1971 press conference held in Strasbourg was supported by 47 anti-nuclear groups (Am is de la ierre, 1975, p. 252) .
At about the same time, traditional environmental organizations became worried about nuclear energy. A first debate was organized in March 1972 in Bordeaux. The driving forces o f the emerging movement, however, were small ecology groups whose focus of interest was broader than the nuclear issue. These groups were often supported by regionalist movements. An im portant m ediat ing role was played by several individuals as well as counter-cultural and eco logical journals (Charlie-Hebdo, L a gueule ouverte, L esa m a g e).
In many respects, 1974 was a crucial year. W ith the sudden increase in oil prices, energy policy, and thus nuclear policy, was placed squarely on the pub lic agenda. In the spring, for the first time, the issue was debated both in the Senate and National Assembly. The government proclaimed its official policy of tout electrique, tout nucléaire (only electricity, only nuclear power) and an nounced a huge nuclear program. In November, the selection of sites for 40 nuclear reactors was published. To facilitate the implementation process the government offered the participation o f local and regional political represen tatives, although this participation has been seen as more symbolic than sub stantial (Oudiz, 1979, p. 161) . Intriguing questions were raised not only about the right choice o f nuclear sites but also on the security, economic and social aspects of nuclear energy. From then on, the anti-nuclear was a visible nation wide phenomena. The candidacy o f o f the ecologist Réné Dumont contributed to a growing sensibility for ecological concerns. Several local referenda on the issue o f nuclear power plants were held. Surprisingly, with the exception o f Flamanville, in all these referenda the pro-nuclear voters were in the minority (Colson, 1977, p. 121 ff; Laurent, 1978, p. 17) .
Despite this upsurge of movement activity, the government did not appear to feel challenged. The pro-nuclear alliance o f all the large political parties stood firm and the government responded only symbolically to the oppositional cri tique. In 1975, the nuclear program was slightly reduced and the slogan o f tout électrique, tout nucléaire was officially abandoned (Puiseux, 1983, p. 6 ) . M ore over, the advisory council, Haul com ité de Venvironnement, which had been founded in 1972, was revitalized in 1975, although it did not play a significant role.
In 1975, 400 scientists signed a manifesto critical o f nuclear power produc tion. Similar activities followed. One year later, the manifesto was supported by 4,000 scientists. In 1975/1976, the anti-nuclear movement became broader and intensified its activités. Local campaigns, meetings and demonstrations were held in many places. In June 1976, during a dem onstration in Plogoff in Brittany, property of the national electricity company ED F was demolished, access roads were blocked, and the site was tem porarily occupied. Malville, the site o f a commer cial fast breeder under construction, became a focus of interest. A dem onstra tion in July 1976 at Malville, organized by 21 anti-nuclear committees and supported both by highly politicized, non-violent activities and by the local population, was quite successful: 20,000 people participated. Despite the pres ence o f police forces and the infamous National Guard (CRS), m any demon strators were able to occupy the construction area without any acts o f violence. This event was seen as stimulating both for activists and scientific observers: " Malville 1976 is the culm ination of a communitarian encounter, o f the exo dus from the counter-cultural ghetto, and the victory over an adversary which is disoriented by the demonstrative renouncement of violence, and the alliance between young students and peasants" (Touraine et al., 1980, p. 144) . To be sure, this is a rather euphoric statement. Different tendencies within the anti nuclear movement were far from merging together. Moreover, dem onstrations in these years were not attended by more than a few thousand people.
Though the movement was not very impressive in terms o f mass m edia cov erage and mass mobilization, it became significantly involved in many local conflicts. Remarkably, the national electricity company stated in February 1976: " In all sites where we carried out opinion polls, people were hostile to wards the construction of nuclear reactors" ( Colson, 1977, p. 122) . Moreover, the movement gradually lost its "outsider" character. In the same year, work ers of the reprocessing plant in La Hague started a strike, which was supported by the socialist trade union (C F D T ). This union had gradually moved to a critical posture and argued in favor of a moratorium for the nuclear program without, however, taking an outspoken anti-nuclear position (CFD T, 1980, p. 8 ).
The year 1977 was both the highlight and the turning point o f the anti-nu clear mobilization in France. While the government pursued its policy of sym bolic concessions, the anti-nuclear movement pulled together its troops (Samuel, 1978, p. 32 ff) . Various organizations and committees, not well co ordinated, mobilized for a large dem onstration at Malville. In term s o f quan tity, it was a success. About 60,000 people, including demonstrators from Italy, Switzerland and particularly West Germany, came to Malville. In reality, the event ended in disaster. Police forces and the National G uard blocked dem onstrators and, after some negotiations, started frontal attacks. One demon strator was killed, three people (among them a policeman) lost a hand or a foot, about 100 additional anti-nuclear protesters were wounded, and some 20 others were arrested, eight o f whom were sentenced to spend several months in jail. O f course, this was not the end of anti-nuclear activities. The credibility o f the opposition movement in the public's eye was, however, seriously damaged, and the movement never really recovered from the Malville disaster. In the same year, though for many other reasons, the national debate over the issue ofnuclear power came to an end (G arraud, 1979, p .4 7 2 ) .
From 1977 on, the question o f whether or not an ecological party should be established, and if so in what form, absorbed much of the energy of the ecolo gist and anti-nuclear groups (Vallet, 1978, p. 204) . The movement could not overcome its fragmented status. Many groups were centered around prominent individuals. Moreover, the traditional left/right cleavage undermined all unifying attempts. Insofar as the Socialist Party, and particularly the Socialist trade union, became more sensitive to ecological concerns, promoting a con cept o f social self-government (autogestion), many anti-nuclear activists, par ticularly those with a left-wing background, were tem pted to follow the siren promising a general renewal via a left-wing government. Local struggles (for instance in Alsace and Brittany) went on, however.
Before the presidential election in 1979, M itterand declared he would slow down the nuclear program, cancel the extension of the reprocessing plant in La Hague, and initiate a referendum on nuclear power. Given such promises and the fact that many activists had a leaning to the political left, he gained the support o f many anti-nuclear activists. By the tim e the movement realized that M itterand's promises were not going to be kept, it was too weak and scattered to m ount an effective revival. Even the Three Mile Island accident had no sig nificant impact on the French anti-nuclear movement. After many years o f demonstrations, blockades and violent actions, only the projected reactor in Plogoff, in Brittany, was cancelled in June 1981.
The fate o f the anti-nuclear movement is probably best illustrated by the case of Brice Lalonde, one of the best known French ecologists involved in anti nuclear activities. In the mid-80s he accused President M itterand o f having betrayed the movement. However, as the present M inister for Environment in a Socialist government, Lalonde has reached some kind of accommodation with nuclear power production. Given the pro-nuclear phalanx o f virtually all estab lished forces, and the fact that the nuclear program has been implemented suc cessfully, there is no doubt that the movement has lost the battle. If there is to be a crisis for nuclear energy in France in the future, it may well be due to economic and technical reasons rather than to the anti-nuclear movement.
West Germany: ongoing campaigns, skirmishes and battles
Anti-nuclear activities in West Germany in the 1960s and the beginning o f the 1970s were relatively insignificant (Radkau, 1983 protesters were attracted to a few local struggles over planned nuclear reactors. O f these, the struggle over the site of Wyhl, on the upper Rhine, became signif icant after the peaceful occupation o f the site lasted several months. The con servative state government was forced to negotiate, reach a formal compromise and end the illegal occupation, for the protesters had considerable support in the local population. Moreover, the anti-nuclear opposition in Wyhl succeeded in a first round o f litigation. In general, although the government strongly sup ported nuclear power on all levels, it was not able develop a clear strategy to deal with its unexpected challengers.
The Wyhl conflict (Rucht, 1980) encouraged many anti-nuclear groups at other sites, particularly in the West German cities. Very quickly a loose coali tion of grassroots and conventional organizations was created and thus formed a real mass movement. Additionally, the engagement of scientists and clerical groups was complemented by the reservations against nuclear energy expressed by minorities within the Social Democratic and Liberal parties.
For the most part, the government reacted on the level of symbolic politics. Among other things, it launched a citizen's dialogue on nuclear energy which, largely unintended, fueled the anti-nuclear critique with further inform ation and arguments. N ot surprisingly, the growth of the movement also provoked counter-mobilization. Whereas pro-nuclear citizen action groups, although sponsored by the nuclear industry, rem ained totally insignificant, pro-nuclear campaigns were more im portant among scientists, particularly in the trade unions. W ith the support o f employers, these mobilized for pro-nuclear mass demonstrations in 1976.
In 1976 and 1977, the situation become really heated. The movem ent orga nized several mass demonstrations with tens of thousands o f people. At the sites of Brokdorf and Grohnde, where protesters tried to imitate the Wyhl oc cupation, the conflicts ended in direct and violent confrontations with police. Unlike in Wyhl, the police were now prepared to react in a param ilitary fashion, and even organize "preventive" attacks. On the other side, the move ment attracted many radical leftist activitists who felt strong enough to risk direct confrontation. Although there was to be no repeat o f Wyhl, the large numbers o f people involved suggest the movement was stronger than ever be fore. Most anti-nuclear activitists were quickly faced with the limits to open confrontation. Many o f them had participated in the mass dem onstration in Malville (France). In 1977, when the movement mobilized against the fast breeder reactor at Kalkar, police even blocked highways to prevent tens of thousands of protesters from gaining access to the Kalkar district.
With this experience, factions within the movement now turned to very dif ferent strategies or combined some of them, for example, carrying out violent actions such as sabotage, acts o f civil disobedience such as blockades and mass
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In reaction to this diversification, the nuclear industry and the state author ities in turn reacted with strategies ranging from criminalization to friendly dialogue. In the following years conflicts on many sites continued. In particu lar, the problem o f nuclear waste storage and reprocessing became dom inant issues. In Gorleben the pro-nuclear forces became more and more defensive. In what was widely seen as a concession to the opposition, they organized an international scientific hearing in H annover on this project. Then at the same tim e as the opposition organized a m ajor protest march from Gorleben to H an nover, the Three Mile Island event "exploded" in the mass media. Along with the strong opposition and the doubts raised by some leading experts, these fac tors brought an end to the Gorleben project in its initial form. Although this was only a partial success for the movement, only the reprocessing project was canceled at this specific site and the larger nuclear waste storage project contin ued; Gorleben -after Wyhl -has become the second nationwide symbol for a successful struggle against nuclear energy ( Rucht, 1980) . By the end of the 1970s the long-term future o f nuclear energy had become a highly controversial m atter not only for the general public, but also within the scientific arena, for trade unions, parties and parliaments. In this period a par liamentary commission investigated the advantages and disadvantages of both nuclear and non-nuclear " energy paths." Their conclusions were ambivalent, but an im portant message o f the commission was that a non-nuclear future, without disastrous consequences for the economy and wealth, was possible. Additionally, the rise o f the Green party, as the only party to take a clear anti nuclear stance, contributed to the continuation of the nuclear discourse within the realm of established politics.
Nonetheless, in the field o f extra-parliamentary conflicts, beside some local conflicts of high significance, the issue of nuclear reprocessing rem ained a m at ter of im portant debate. In the early 1980s, the selection of W ackersdorf (Ba varia) for a reprocessing facility occasioned a highly symbolic and tenacious struggle in which a broad range of strategies and counter-strategies were em ployed (Kretschm er and Rucht, 1987; Kretschmer, 1988) . Unlike earlier con flicts, both the trade unions and the social democrats here moved to the side o f the critics. In spite of the strength of the opposition, however, the likelihood o f stopping this project seemed very remote. In many respects, the event at Cher nobyl was crucial. In addition to the event itself, the way the adm inistration reacted to it was significant. The nuclear industry and regulatory agencies lost much credibility, the movement was revitalized, and new social strata, among them many young mothers, joined the movement. Now, the large m ajority o f Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party and the trade unions took an anti-nu clear stance. The argument was no longer on the ultimate issue of nuclear power per se, but on the conditions and the timing of phasing it out. Even the con servative government, at least rhetorically, now agreed that nuclear power would be viable for a transitory period o f only some decades.
Even before the Chernobyl event, the nuclear program had reached a phase of stalemate. The industry was concentrating on the completion o f facilities already under construction and no additional reactors were ordered. The sur prising abandonment o f the formerly tenaciously defended W ackersdorf pro ject -for monetary cost-benefit reasons and against the advice o f the federal government -has contributed to the delegitimation of nuclear energy in West Germany. Most people in West Germany have lost their faith in nuclear en ergy. The anti-nuclear movement could do little about the installation o f nu clear generating equipm ent that now provides about one-third of the West Ger man electrical production. But against this initial phase, the present weakness of nuclear power's credibility and its apparently limited future suggest that the anti-nuclear movement will not be the final loser. As in the French situation, this prognosis is due not only to the effect of oppositional movements, but also to factors external to them. Thus, for domestic reasons as well as the lack of an export market, the nuclear industry in Germany is presently in a substantial crisis.
A comparative assessment o f the three cases Courses o f conflicts
Overall, the courses o f conflicts in the three countries examined here appear very similar. U p to the late 1960s, only individuals or small groups protested against nuclear energy production. Usually, these protests were locally based, isolated from each other and largely insignificant. Some years earlier than in Europe, anti-nuclear groups in the USA spread out all over the country, form ing loose networks and gaining momentum. In Europe, the first to flourish was the French movement and it was soon followed by the West German one. By the mid-70s, significant anti-nuclear energy movements existed in virtually all those Western countries which relied, or intended to rely, on nuclear energy. In this period, when the movements established nationwide and even interna tional networks, they constituted a significant challenge to official energy poli cies. The issue of nuclear power was widely debated in public. In France and West Germany, opinion polls dem onstrated a significant increase in popular opposition (Kiersch and Von Oppeln, 1983,p. 77) . In the first half of the 1970s in the USA, between 25 and 30% o f the population expressed a negative atti tude towards nuclear power (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984, p. 211). In the USA and West Germany there was a de facto moratorium on new plant construction. The USA was the first country where a powerful nuclear indus try, and consequently the anti-nuclear power movement, experienced a rapid decline (in the late 1970s). W ith the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 this decline became definite. Only in France, at least up to the mid 80s, was the ambitious nuclear power program carried out as planned. In spite of this fact, the anti-nuclear movement in France did not grow, but rather, experienced decay. Unlike in France, the West G erm an movement survived into the 1980s, although on a smaller scale than before. W ith the "Chernobyl effect," the Ger man movement became revitalized and centered around the conflict over a m ajor nuclear reprocessing plant, which, by the end of the 1980s, was canceled for economic reasons. Today, in all three countries, the opposition to nuclear power has lost its intensity. In the USA and West Germany, this is due, at least in part, to the success o f the opposition. In France, the situation was just the opposite. The strength of the pro-nuclear forces, and the lack of institutional leverage points for the anti-nuclear movement, led to its deep frustration and finally its decay.
Strategies and action repertoires
t One finds the dual typology of assimilative strategies and confrontational strategies, at least on one level, evident in anti-nuclear movements in all three countries. In general, confrontational strategies were relatively im portant in West Germany, while they did not play a significant role in the USA. The French movement ranged in between. These statements, however, need further qualification.
First, disruptive and confrontational actions (e.g. sit-ins during hearings) sometimes took place within the legal and procedural participation o f protest groups. In many other cases, demonstrations were organized in parallel or in direct reaction to the outcome of procedural participation.
Second, one can question the typology insofar as demonstrations are sub sumed to confrontational strategies. Depending on the character o f the dem onstrations, this may not necessarily be wrong. In many cases, however, dem onstrations were rather conventional and peaceful, and therefore come closer to assimilative strategies.
Third, the actual strategies of anti-nuclear movements within the same coun try varied considerably over time. more strategic shifts. Moreover, the strategic changes mentioned by Kitschelt are not discussed in relation to opportunity structures.
Besides the problem of changing general strategies within the same political opportunity structure there is still another need for differentation. If a national protest movement is classified according to the respective dominance of assim ilative or confrontational strategies, or a combination of them, we still know little about the quality and the range of the action repertoire, never m ind typi cal strategic and tactical dilemmas (Barkan, 1989 ) . Confrontational action may or may not involve terrorist sabotage. Assimilative strategies, such as partici pation in administrative procedures, can be used in very different ways. Pro test groups may be convinced that this is the only legitimate form to express dissent, and thus will accept the outcome whatever it may be. O ther groups may rely on this instrum ent to demonstrate its purely symbolic function, with radical activities already in mind. Coming back to our cases, we could argue that the anti-nuclear movement in the USA relied primarily on non-confrontational forms of action because o f its pragmatic character and its general belief in the reform capacities of the political system. On the other hand, both the German and the French anti-nuclear movements pursued conventional chan nels o f expressing discontent with less hope, and even with cynicism. Thus, we would have to decipher the meaning of various activities with respect to na tional movements, and particularly to certain tendencies. Given the nature o f the French political system, and the intransigent way the nuclear program was implemented, much more violence could have been expected in France as com pared to Germany. This was, however, not the case.
Moreover, any explanation o f movement strategies based on structural fac tors ignores the role o f crucial events. For instance, the disaster o f Malville in July 1977 was in fact the Waterloo o f the French anti-nuclear movement. On the other hand, the successful occupation in Wyhl continued to inspire many later protest activities, such as the resistance against the reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf (Kretschm er and Rucht, 1987) . Similarly, a m ajor scandal such as the Silkwood case can heavily undermine the credibility of the nuclear in dustry, and fuel intensive anti-nuclear engagement. Finally, there are contin gent events, such as nuclear accidents, which may cause a revival o f the move ment and even inspire new forms of action. The most spectacular o f these was the largest anti-nuclear dem onstration in the USA, following the Three Mile Island accident. Hence we would have to identify turning points which should not be underestim ated in their effect upon public opinion, strategies and counter-strategies, and we would have to study the action repertoire of a move m ent as it developed over time.
Regarding these problems, we would probably not only need a more refined typology of strategies, but also, a broader set o f explanatory factors. One weak ness of a purely structural approach is that it ignores completely the dynamic interplay of the actors. Isn't it reasonable to assume that the choice of strategies depends heavily on the previous or expected measures of one's opponent?
Organization and mobilization capacity
In relation to the size of the country, the West German anti-nuclear move ment has clearly the most developed organizational infrastructure and the highest mobilization capacity. Moreover, unlike in France and the USA, many campaigns were carried out on the national level. This national coordination was facilitated by a twofold network o f more conventional environmental as sociations, on the one hand, and the loosely coupled radical action groups on the other. In none of the three countries could any organization attain a hege monic position within the movement. For the most part, one finds SPIN-type organizations (Gerlach and Hine, 1970) . In the USA it is probably the sheer size of the country, together with the decentralized structure of the electricity industry, which fosters the decentralization o f movement organization and ac tivity. Also, the anti-nuclear movement in France, despite the highly central ized structure o f the French adm inistration and nuclear power industry, acted primarily on the local, rather than national, level. This is certainly an effect of the strong anti-centralist attitudes within the overall French environmental movement. We can conclude from these findings that there is no general cor relation in the degree o f centralization o f the state and industry with th at o f the organization o f the anti-nuclear movement.
Similarly, we cannot assume a close correlation between a m ovem ent's mo bilization capacity and the outcome o f its mobilization. Kitschelt is certainly right in arguing that " the number of participants in various protest activities...tum s out to be a poor predictor of a movement's impact...Also the num ber and total membership of anti-nuclear protest organizations does not yield a reliable independent measure of protest intensity..." (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 73) . Moreover, organization and quantitative mobilization in the nuclear power is sue has to be considered in relation to other conflict areas and issues. W hat may be a low num ber in cross-national comparison can be perceived as re markable within a given country. In addition, one should take into account the structure of a " m ovement's industry." Even if the num ber of organized adher ents may be impressive, organizations may have a low impact if they are preoc cupied with strong inter-organizational conflicts. This is one reason why the environmental movement in France was weak compared to that o f West Ger many (Rucht, 1989) . Intra-organizational conflicts may even block organiza tions with millions of members to the extent that they cannot act as a pressure group -as was the case with the German Alliance for Nature Protection (DeutscherNaturschutzring).
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Despite his own reservations on the significance o f mass mobilization, Kitschelt argues that in the "closed regimes" of the French and West Germ an case situations, more people attended demonstrations, in a given period, than in " open regimes" such as those in Sweden and the USA (Kitschelt, 1986 , p. 71 f f ). But if this the case, how is it that France, with a political regime much more closed than that o f Germany, never experienced the size of G erm an anti nuclear demonstrations (100,000 people in Hannover in 1979; 120,000 in Brokdorf in 1981; 150,000 at an anti-nuclear festival in Burglenglenfeld in 1986) (cf Nelkin and Poliak, 1981) ? And why is it that the num ber of people arrested in acts of civil disobedience, from 1974 to 1979, seemed to be higher in the USA than in France and West Germany if, in the former case, predomi nantly assimilative strategies were employed? O f course, one could argue that arrest may have a lower significance in the USA than in Europe. However, the intensive preparation o f US protest groups for the eventual case o f arrests, and the fact that sometimes friends or relatives replaced an activist (if personal disadvantages as a consequence o f arrest were expected), suggests that there may be significant costs in acts o f civil disobedience.
Finally, there is a methodological caveat if we argue, for or against the policy impact o f mass mobilization or o f distinct strategies. We know little; about crit ical thresholds. A bit more or less radicalism may completely change the per ception of the action.
Outcomes
Probably the greatest variance between our three cases could be found with respect to the substantial outcomes of the anti-nuclear struggles. In absolute figures, the USA still produces more nuclear energy than any other country. At a closer look, however, it is clear that nuclear power production in the USA, having lost both its economic attraction and its legitimation in the eyes of the public, has become a dead end. In Germany, where at present about one-third of the electricity production comes from nuclear power, the development of nuclear power has been at a standstill for a few years. Although the future of nuclear energy is open, because the established parties are divided over the issue it is likely that nuclear energy will be less im portant in the future, if not abandoned altogether. By contrast, in relative terms, France has implemented the world's most ambitious nuclear program. Today, more than two-thirds o f its national electricity production is based on nuclear power. Due to its deep involvement in nuclear power, the national electricity company has consider able overcapacity and enormous debts. In the foreseeable future there will be no increase, or only a slight one, in nuclear power production in France.
The procedural outcomes o f the nuclear struggles, such as the extension of citizens' rights in licensing procedures and in getting information, have been D .R ucht/ Anti-nuclear movements low in the USA and insignificant in West Germany and France. The structural impacts on the regime itself seem to be insignificant in all three countries. As for political outcomes, i.e. the acknowledgement of the anti-nuclear movement as a serious and legitimate actor, there have been more significant gains in the USA and West Germany than in France.
The limits of structural explanation At this point in our discussion of the range o f empirical findings o f strategies and action repertoires in a cross-national perspective, some of the problems and limits o f a structural explanation have become evident. In this section, in discussing our initial question of the determinants of strategies and action rep ertoires of anti-nuclear movements, I will examine a num ber of conceptual problems more systematically, and I will relate our empirical findings to Kitschelt's structural approach, presented in the first section of this paper.
The diffusion o f effective arguments and actions
Given the similarities in the strategies and actions o f anti-nuclear move ments in different countries at the same period, it is hard to explain these fea tures mainly by a parameter such as the "openness of political regimes." The remarkable coincidence o f similar protest activities in different countries, for example, the spreading out o f direct action between 1975 and 1977, could be interpreted by two mechanisms. First, modern mass media convey news of spectacular events immediately and extensively. Second, the international net work of the anti-nuclear movements allows for a constant and direct exchange o f experiences. W ith this communication, effective protest actions tend to be quickly adopted beyond local and national borders. Sometimes, as was the case in various specific anti-nuclear conflicts, activists from different countries even joined in common action. Hence, the significance of national opportunity structures, as a crucial variable, has to be relativized. Despite significant dif ferences in regime structures, one finds very similar protest techniques em ployed in the same period. Moreover, the demand for a nuclear moratorium became relevant in all three countries in the same period o f the mid-70s. Also, the fact that the nuclear programs were introduced at different periods, whereas the overall timing of the anti-nuclear movement cycle was roughly similar in the three countries, has certainly to do with the cross-national diffusion of anti nuclear arguments and actions -factors that are not specific to the countries discussed here.
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Socio-cultural factors
Besides political structures, there are also deeply rooted socio-cultural con ditions that may shape considerably the conflicts within a given country. Gamson (1988 ) has rightly emphasized the role of "cultural themes." These repre sent a general reference frame which may resonate more or less with the specific frames and symbols promoted by conflictual actors (see also Ladd et al., 1983) . In France, for example, the traditional vitality o f anti-centralist attitudes in the provinces provided a strong backing for anti-nuclear activities. In this perspec tive, nuclear energy was seen as a part o f " internal colonization" in the interest of big capital and state bureaucracies located in Paris. Given the radical ideas and action repertoire of regionalist movements, and their overlap with envi ronmental and anti-nuclear groupings, it is no wonder that the anti-nuclear movement in this country tended toward radical action and highly decentral ized organizational structures.
The variation o f strategies over tim e
A closer analysis o f social movement strategies has revealed considerable variation, even in the same country, over time. Obviously, a structural ap proach that assumes stable opportunities cannot account for such variations. Here, a range of conjunctural factors may come into play, such as temporal opportunity structures (for example, a new government which is more openminded towards the anti-nuclear argum ents), the rise of a new ally (e.g. the trade unions in the German case), a shift in the counter-strategies of a major movement's opponent, a gradual move o f public opinion on the issue at stake, the rise of a m ovem ent's party in the electoral arena, changing internal condi tions of oppositional groups, or contingent events (such as the death o f an ac tivist or an accident in a nuclear plant).
Likewise, other phenomena such as the ongoing relevance o f the West Ger man anti-nuclear movement, its strong reactions to the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents (in contrast to F rance), or the rapid decline o f the French anti-nuclear movement apparently do not depend on inert political input struc tures. With respect to the latter example, in order to explain the m ovem ent's decline we would have to assess such factors as how the mass m edia presented outstanding protest events, party and governmental constellations, the degree of factionalism within the movement, and the relevant issues competing with the nuclear one within a national arena, etc.
In Kitschelt's approach, counter-strategies employed by the opponents of the anti-nuclear movement, particularly by state authorities, political parties, trade unions and the nuclear industry, are not discussed in detail. To be sure, such dimensions as "access to the political system" and "implementation capacity" may represent general strategic orientations which have crystallized into struc tural forms. These structures may favor or restrict a movement's strategic op tions. But, insofar as these structures are conceptualized as stable patterns o f a political regime, there must be other factors which determine variations o f counter-strategies in response to the activities o f the anti-nuclear movement.
If we look at counter-strategies used by a state to neutralize or defeat anti nuclear forces we find considerable variations over time. In West Germany, for example, the anti-nuclear protests in the early 1970s were not taken seriously. After they increased in relevance, the M inistry of Research and Technology initiated a public relations campaign. Moreover, in order to dem onstrate its open-mindness, it published a volume which documented the positions o f var ious pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear groups, hoping that the decision on the nu clear power program could be legitimized at least post facto by an exchange o f arguments in which the pro-nuclear side was expected to win (Bundesministerium Jur Forschung und Technologie, 1974) . Only when the protests continued and intensified did state authorities attem pt to develop a better understanding o f the grounds for protest. In the mid-70s, the adm inistration engaged a com mercial social science institute to study the motives o f anti-nuclear protest (Battelle-Institut, 1975) . Subsequently, the Ministry of Research and Tech nology launched the Burgerdialog Kernenergie (citizens' dialogue on nuclear power) in order to channel and appease the protests. Instead o f creating trust in nuclear policy, this dialogue turned out to raise some pertinent questions, e.g. on the unsolved problem of nuclear waste disposal, the weak participation o f the parliam ent and the citizenry in energy policy, etc. Then the dialogue was stopped and state authorities started a counter-attack on the anti-nuclear movement, particularly by criticizing its lack of substantial and legal compe tence to challenge nuclear policy. This attack became harsher when parts o f the anti-nuclear movement shifted to aggressive and violent forms o f resistance. In this period, particularly in 1977, repression and criminalization o f anti-nu clear forces became an important counter-strategy. At the same time, however, representatives o f the administration adm itted that there were still problems with nuclear power (e.g. waste disposal), and that the concerns of " honest" citizens would be appreciated and respected. W ithin the Social Democratic and the Liberal parties, scientists and even trade unions became seriously divided over the nuclear issue and, moreover, it was no longer possible to ridicule and attem pt to delegitimate the opposition as a whole. Consequently, state author ities became more receptive to forms of compromise. Morover, in 1979 a par liam entary commission was established to evaluate the chances and risks o f a non-nuclear future. And in the same year, the Prime M inister of Lower Saxony canceled the project of a nuclear reprocessing plant because o f the large opposition.
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The Germ an example of shifting counter-strategies over tim e suggests that a meaningful analysis o f strategies and counter-strategies has to shift to a more concrete analytical level in order to identify strategically defined sequences of the nuclear power struggle. In particular, the interplay of action and reaction has to be investigated. Only this kind o f analysis would allow for an under standing o f why specific strategies are used by a given actor at a given time.
The coexistence o f different strategies
We also found in our study the coexistence of different strategies and counter strategies in the same period and country. As mentioned above, Germ an state authorities sometimes employed a dual strategy o f discrim ination and sym bolic or substantial concessions. This leads to the conclusion that if structural opportunities account at all for these strategies, there must be non-determining opportunities, or, to put it differently, there must be contrasting perceptions of opportunities which account for the differential choice of strategies. As we know, social movements may use different strategies in an implicit division of labor. More often, they are bitterly divided over their strategies. The same may be true for the movements' opponents. In these cases, the anti-and pro-nuclear sides can hardly be conceptualized as unified actors.
General definitions, such as the predominance of confrontational movement strategies in France, may not be necessarily wrong, but they hide a lot o f assim ilative activities that were carried out in the same period. The French anti nuclear movement did its best to exploit all channels o f procedural participa tion. Parts of the movement collected signatures and signed petitions, cam paigned for many local referendums, litigated, were involved in governmental advisory committees, became heavily engaged in electoral campaigns from the local to the European level and, finally, established lists and political parties. The fact that these channels offered less opportunities than in other countries, and that the movement was less successful, should not make us forget that a lot of energy was invested in these assimilative strategies.
Moreover, the notion of a movement's "strategic choice" should not be taken too literally. One may question the degree to which the French movement gen erally relied on confrontational strategies. Moreover, at least on the level o f the movement as a whole, there seemed to be no conscious choice of strategy. Dif ferent factions within the movement always had different perceptions, and thus relied on different strategies. O ther factions combined various strategies. What has been said o f another kind of movement seems to be true as well for the anti-nuclear movements discussed here: " It is far more accurate to say that each nation's peace movement employs both assimilative and confrontational strategies, and that each strategy is pushed as far as it can be taken" (Rochon, 1987, p. 12) .
The meaning o f the conflict
An explanatory approach also has to ask for the meaning of the nuclear con flict in a given country in different periods. A conflict can bear loadings far beyond the immediate issue under discussion, though in the case o f opposition to nuclear power, the extent to which this "was and is a surrogate issue for many on the Left" (R othm an and Lichter, 1987) is debatable. Gamson (1988) has introduced the idea that in a discourse over a conflictual issue a set o f culturally available "packages" emerges which he calls an " issue culture." Investigating these packages in the public discourse on nuclear power in the USA, Gamson (1989) found that these packages changed over time. One could go a step further in arguing that it is not only the meaning that different actors give to nuclear power which shapes their attitudes and activi ties. In order to explain, for instance, strategic choices, we would have to inves tigate how the protesters perceive their role, whom they define as their oppo nent, what their ultimate goals are, and who feels challenged or threatened by whom through which forms of protest or counter-measures. This does not nec essarily imply that we take the actor's self-image, ideology and utopia for real ity, but that we at least consider them as factors that influence social interac tion (for the Clamshell Alliance, see Downey, 1986) . Addressing questions like these in relation to the three movements examined here, we find significant differences in the meaning o f the anti-nuclear struggle.
The impact of the meaning o f the conflict can be illustrated with respect to the perception o f the role o f the state. In France and West Germany, a signifi cant part of the anti-nuclear movement struggled not only against a particular policy, but, at least in the present form, against the state per se. The state was perceived as being heavily engaged in promoting nuclear power and benefiting in many ways from the economic and social setting that corresponds to this source of energy. Terms such as the "atomic state" in Germany or " electrofascisme" in France made and still make sense for many anti-nuclear activists in these two countries (Bosquet, 1975; Jungk, 1977) .
From the very beginning, the French and German states strongly supported the civil use o f nuclear energy. Public adm inistrations even prom oted nuclear energy in periods when the electricity producers where reluctant to became engaged in nuclear power production. There was also a problematic overlap o f interest. In Germany, it was often the case that the same politician was respon sible for both the licensing and control o f nuclear energy plants and economic decisions in public enterprises related to nuclear energy. Moreover, "the state" was physically present in the effort to defend the sites in their use not only of local police forces, but also of the national guard, anti-terrorist brigades and paramilitary tactics. In France, more than in the USA, the regulation o f nuclear energy production was closely linked to military interests. To this day, the French nuclear agency CEA is responsible for both the military and civil use o f nuclear energy. Even in West Germany, a state which does not possess nuclear arms, there still are people who are suspicious o f the potential misuse o f nu clear reactors for military purposes. For many groups, opposing a nuclear site meant attacking the capitalist state or technocracy in general. This at least partly explains the intensity o f the conflict. The administrations in France and West Germany were quite right in their pierception that among the anti-nuclear ac tivists there were groups using the nuclear question primarily as a leverage point for challenging the state.
Compared to the situation in France and West Germany, in the USA there is not only easier access to the political system, but also a lower significance of this system for economic and socio-cultural life. Unlike in Europe, the state is considered to be a (potential) third party. This implies appeals to the state to take this role seriously (see, for example, Ebbin and Kasper, 1974) instead of an all-out frontal attack against the state. O f course, this comes close to Kitschelt's arguments about the reasons for assimilative strategies in the USA. However, the regime's structure, i.e. its institutional openness to demands, is a feature which is distinct from the relevance and perception of the adm inistra tion's role in the conflict. Both aspects have to be considered and assessed.
Towards the concept o f arena
It should be clear from the discussion above that an "institutional" ap proach, focusing exclusively on relatively inert national political opportunity structures, has its limits. First, structural political opportunities exist both be yond and below the national level. Second, there are political opportunities which vary during the course of the conflict. Third, non-political opportunity structures may be relevant. Fourth, procedural and interactive factors come into play. In short, there is a need for a more complex approach which would be designed for a better integration of various aspects of structure and process.
Structures are, by definition, relatively stable relations between various com ponents o f a system. Structure does not entirely determine action, b u t it chan nels interactions within certain limits. Interaction, in turn, may also produce structure. Because o f this " duality of structure" we cannot simply assume that structure determines action (Giddens, 1984) .
Probably the idea o f an arena could be applied as a fruitful analytical tool for analyzing conflicts such as the struggle over nuclear power (for an application o f a specific kind of arena concept on the West German nuclear conflict, see Kitschelt, 1980) . Although this is not the place for developing a detailed con cept of arena, some basic ideas will be presented here.
An arena can be defined as a structurally bound setting in which conflictual interaction takes place. In the course of the conflict the arena itself becomes structured in a more specific sense. This may include clearer definitions o f ac tors' roles, the development o f informal procedures of interaction, the ritualization of conflicts, the identification o f points of agreement and disagreement, and the emergence of a division o f labor within the movement, etc. The idea of the arena involves not only at least two conflicting parties, but also, the au dience. In contrast to an arena as a mere play, in social and political arenas the audience is usually a crucial factor. At least in democratic societies, its leaning in the conflict may be decisive for the outcome. Therefore, the conflicting par ties do not only calculate their strategies and tactics with respect to the imme diate impact on the other side, but also, with respect to the audience. In con sequence, we would not only have to investigate the interaction o f the movement and its opponents, but also the role of third parties -particularly that of the media and potential allies not yet or only indirectly involved in the conflict.
The main advantage of such an arena concept is that it could relate structure and action. A second advantage is that it implies no premature assumptions on the type and level of structure channeling and shaping interaction. There may be pre-existing structures which are a given for all actors within the arena. There may be others which are more variable, and which may eventually themselves become matters of conflict. Also, we can imagine a national arena in which international factors may come into play. A third advantage is that this concept puts emphasis on the interactive processes between the conflicting parties and the audience which, usually, are widely neglected. Fourth, in a diachronic or synchronic perspective there may be several relevant arenas in which the same or different actors are engaged.
It has to emphasized that the concept o f an arena is only an analytical tool and not to be confused with an actual building, i.e. some kind of coliseum fea turing a clear distinction between insiders and outsiders, with barriers separat ing the actors from the audience. Arenas are social phenomena with fluid zones between interactions within the arena and everyday life. There are also fields o f action which are not linked or are only indirectly linked to the highly visible struggles which take place in arenas. Moreover, a closer investigation o f the interplay of different actors within a structural setting could lead to the conclu sion that the idea of the movement, the state or the political opportunity struc ture in a given nation always tends to be problematic. These are highly aggre gated concepts to which general reference is made without specifying the actors, activities and periods one has in mind. In reality, those " actors" perceived to be in an action system are rather themselves action systems composed of var ious parts which rarely push or pull in the same direction. But there are mo ments when heterogeneous forces become unified and the idea of an arena ap plies the best.
As for anti-nuclear struggles, we first would have to identify the most rele vant arenas in different periods. For instance, we could identify an arena o f the scientific debate on nuclear energy, a parliamentary arena, an arena of mass publics, an arena o f litigation, etc. Second, we would have to identify encoun ters that take place within these arenas. Encounters are crucial interactions o f the conflicting parties centered around a more specific question, e.g. a major debate on a new law concerning nuclear energy, a direct confrontation between mass demonstrators and police during the occupation of a nuclear site, etc.
Political opportunity structures which are not always national would have a decisive impact on an actor's strategy within a specific arena. In some cases and periods, a m ajor decision concerning nuclear power in a neighboring coun try, a spectacular encounter in another type of arena, the sudden strategic shift of the opponent in the same arena or a contingent external event may be more im portant.
Admittedly, these are only rough ideas about the direction of further concep tual work. In addition to a further elaboration o f the concept of (national) opportunity structures, more attention should be given to arenas in which ac tion and issue framing takes place. Only with more complex conceptual tools and better empirical inform ation would we be equipped to make a solid cross national comparison.
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Conclusion
Rather than elaborating and applying my own explanatory concept on the course and forms of nuclear conflicts, it has been my intention to demonstrate the difficulties and limits of such an enterprise, referring in particular to Her bert Kitschelt, who has presented an advanced explanatory approach in this field. This approach clearly has its value. Factors such as open or closed polit ical input structures and strong or weak political output structures do have a certain explanatory power for an account o f strategies. In particular, there is a high probability that closed political input structures in democratic regimes will induce more radical actions by opposition movements. We can also as sume that the im plem entation capacity of a political regime is an im portant factor in determining the outcome o f a policy once the decisions have been made. In general, however, it has been argued that the concept o f political op
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Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 portunity structure in its present form can only serve as a starting point for a more sophisticated analysis which includes a broader range of explanatory variables (Kriesi, 1989 ; see also Tarrow, 1989) .
First, a cross-national comparison o f contemporary conflicts over such mod em technologies as nuclear power production has to take into account the as pect of transnational diffusion through the mass media and transnational net working of movements and their opponents. Second, beyond political structures, there are historical and socio-cultural conditions which may consid erably shape conflicts within a given country. For instance, the French anti nuclear movement was strongly influenced by the pre-existence of radical regionalist movements. Third, a closer analysis of social movement strategies has dem onstrated that these may vary significantly over time. A structural ap proach referring to stable opportunities cannot account for these variations. Here, a range of time-specific factors may come into play (e.g. conjunctural opportunity structures, strategic shifts o f one major actor, changes in public opinion, contingent events, etc.). Moreover, the attribution of confrontational or assimilative strategies tells us little about the actual action repertoire that has been employed. This depends more on the interplay of the actors than on inert polititical opportunity structures. Fourth, we also found in our cases the coexistence of different strategies in the same period in the same country. This has to do with different perceptions and evaluations of the same "objective" opportunity structure. Different perceptions, strategies and organizational structures, even within one party o f the conflict, suggest that movements can rarely be conceptualized as unified actors. Finally, an explanatory approach has also to ask for the meaning o f the conflict in a given period and a given country which can relate to questions far beyond the immediate m atter of con flict. Obviously, the choice o f strategies and action repertoires will be influ enced by the actors' perceptions o f what is at stake.
We may conclude from these points that an attem pt to explain the strategies and action repertoires of anti-nuclear struggles in a comparative perspective has to go beyond the identification of national political opportunity structures. O ur empirical description of three cases has unveiled a highly differentiated picture. Only with these detailed stories o f the anti-nuclear conflicts in m ind may we become sensitive to the broad variety of variables which may play a potential role, and thus have to be considered and weighed.
W ithout going into detail, I have presented some ideas on a concept of arena which could allow structural and process variables to be related without mak ing any premature assumptions about their respective relevance. In contrast to a purely institutional approach, such an am ea concept also puts emphasis on the dynamics of interaction, including the interactions' feedback on some ele m ents of a structural setting. Public areans, however, in which the reaction o f Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 the audience also may be a crucial factor, represent only the most spectacular, but not necessarily the most im portant, side of the coin. It is also the microcos mos of social action which lays the groundwork for mobilization, new cam paigns, skirmishes and battles in the future.
